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Don Patinkin’s Ph.D. dissertation  
as the prehistory of disequilibrium theories 
Goulven Rubin♦ 
Revised for HOPE, july 2010. 
This work is the outgrowth of ideas first presented in a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of 
Chicago in 1947 and then further developed in a series of articles published in various journals and 
anthologies through the years 1948 to 1954. (1956: vii) 
The opening sentence of Money, Interest, and Prices, has attracted the attention of most 
scholars who wrote about Don Patinkin’s works in recent years. As shown by Boianovsky 
(2006), Merhling (2002) or Rubin (2002a), reading Patinkin’s doctoral dissertation shed new 
light on his major work. However, these articles contain only partial presentations of the 
thesis. This essay contributes to fill in this gap. It offers a detailed presentation of the second 
part of Patinkin’s Ph.D dissertation and claims that this document foreshadowed the research 
programs of disequilibrium theorists of the 1970’s. 
“On the consistency of economic models: a theory of involuntary unemployment”, the text 
submitted to a committee composed of Gregg Lewis, Paul Douglas, Theodore O. Yntema and 
chaired by Jacob Marschak in August 1947, was composed of two parts. The first part 
analyzed how various general equilibrium models failed to incorporate money in a consistent 
manner. As indicated by the general title, the second part of the thesis, on involuntary 
unemployment, seemed the most important to the young economist. Actually, the two parts 
were written in reverse order. Patinkin started from the idea of explaining unemployment as 
the consequence of an “inconsistency” of the classical system (Patinkin, 1995, 379). But in a 
second phase, probably under the influence of the members of the Cowles Commission 
(Mehrling, 2002), he undertook to develop Lange’s criticism of the traditional dichotomy of 
general equilibrium theory between the determination of relative prices and the determination 
of money prices. 
                                                 
♦Correspondence may be addressed to Goulven Rubin, Laboratoire d’Economie Dyonisien, Université de 
Paris 8 Saint-Denis, 2 rue de la Liberté, 93526 Saint-Denis cedex, France; e-mail : goulven.rubin@univ-
paris8.fr. The author wishes to thank Carlo Benetti, Alain Béraud, Michel De Vroey, Mauro Boianovsky and an 
anonymous referee for their helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to the staff of the 
Special Collection Library of Duke University for their help with the Don Patinkin Papers. 
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I will focus on the discussion of unemployment for it is the most surprising. The discussion 
on money was nothing but an early version of the first part of Money, Interest and Prices, 
though at this stage Patinkin did not realize that the real balance effect could cope for the 
inconsistency of the traditional dichotomy. The discussion of unemployment differed in many 
respects from the theory of unemployment finally presented in chapters 13 and 14 of Money, 
Interest and Prices. Patinkin adopted an unemployment equilibrium perspective (Rubin, 
2002a) and rejected the Pigou effect (Rubin, 2005). But above all, he developed several 
concepts that were either abandoned or marginalized in the making of his book. In effect, as 
shown by Boianovsky in his careful study of the tortuous process leading from Patinkin’s 
thesis to chapters 13 and 14 of Money, Interest and Prices “Patinkin’s views about 
unemployment phenomena” did not evolved “linearly and cumulatively” (2006, 194). 
The first part of the paper analyzes the research program underlying the thesis. The second 
part presents Patinkin’s 1947 theory of involuntary unemployment. This part of the thesis 
displayed a mathematical apparatus composed of 325 equations and a burgeoning set of 
models. This apparatus has been simplified and its notations homogenised. Part 3 and part 4 
study how Patinkin and the members of the Cowles Commission failed to realize the full 
implications of his research program. It is argued that with his “theory of compromise” and 
his concept of “additional restraint”, Patinkin had gathered nearly all the ingredients to forge 
the twin notions of “spillover effect” and “dual decision hypothesis”. The concept of 
“spillover” was developed later by Patinkin (1952, 1956). The “dual decision hypothesis” was 
put forward by Clower (1965). Both concepts were pieced together by Robert Barro and 
Herschel Grossman in a famous 1971 article and played a crucial role in disequilibrium 
macroeconomics. Part 5 concludes on Patinkin’s position in the history of disequilibrium 
theories. 
1. Patinkin’s research program 
The second part of Patinkin’s thesis addressed three issues. First, Patinkin intended to 
derive a Keynesian macromodel from a Walrasian model. Second and in order to do so, he 
proposed to elaborate the microeconomics of action under “additional restraints”. Finally, he 
wanted to reconcile the kind of adjustment at work in Samuelson’s diagonal cross diagram 
with the law of supply and demand. I will show how this research program emerged out of the 
intellectual context of the mid-forties at the University of Chicago. 
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1.1. A Walrasian approach 
During his first years as a student of the Department of Economics of the University of 
Chicago, from 1941 to 1943, Patinkin was barely exposed to the mathematical economics of 
Walras and the Lausanne school. The main reference with respect to price theory was 
Marshall, the only exception being the reading of Cassel (1932) who “reproduced Walras’ 
system without mentioning his name!” (Patinkin, 1995, 362). As a graduate student, between 
1944 and 1945, Patinkin studied Marshall’s Principles for it was the basic text of the lectures 
given by Knight and Viner, the then dominant figures at Chicago University. He discovered 
mathematical economics only through the courses of Lange: 
But Lange’s most valuable course for me was the one on Mathematical Economics (i.e. what was then called 
mathematical economics!). Here he systematically took us through the Mathematical Appendix of Hicks’ 
Value and Capital (1939), as well as Paul Samuelson’s path breaking article on “The stability of equilibrium” 
(1941), subsequently reproduced as chapter 9 of the latter’s’ Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947). My 
lecture notes from this course served me as a “reference volume” for many years to come. (1995, 372) 
This initiation was continued by a course on mathematical economics and a seminar on 
Tinbergen’s 1939 econometric model of the United States both dispensed by Marschak. It was 
completed by Patinkin’s immersion in the context of the Cowles Commission, the 
organization in which he would write his doctoral dissertation. 
Under the influence of Lange, Klein and the members of the Cowles Commission, Patinkin 
came to believe in the existence of an organic link between a Keynesian orientation and the 
practice of mathematical economics. His enthusiasm for mathematical economics at this stage 
is reflected in a manuscript probably written in 1948. In it, he stated “the people who are 
mathematical economists are mostly the young economists believing that government must 
play a larger role in the economic sphere”1. State intervention required the knowledge of the 
parameters of the economic systems. This could be obtained by estimation of simultaneous 
equations systems. But the development of these systems implied mathematical economics.  
A Walrasian orientation was conspicuous in the first part of the thesis on the integration of 
money in general equilibrium systems: 
The first part consists of an examination of the “classical system”. As in the examination of any body of 
thought, the problem of textual interpretation immediately arises. To minimize this problem, I shall concern 
myself with the mathematical classical school of economics: Walras, Pareto, and certain of their followers. 
(1947, 5) 
                                                 
1
 See Merhling (2002) for a complete quotation. 
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But as we will show below, the models of the Lausanne school were also presented as the 
models of reference in the second part of the thesis. There Patinkin undertook a Walrasian 
reconstruction of Keynes’ theory of unemployment in order to clarify its foundations. 
The idea that an integration of the Keynesian and the Walrasian theories would strengthen 
the Keynesian position came from Lange (1938, 1944) and from Hicks (1939). In his 
autobiography, Patinkin (1995, 371) wrote that, in his course on business cycle theory, Lange 
offered a detailed presentation of the General Theory based on “The rate of interest and the 
optimum propensity to consume” (1938). In this article, Lange presented Keynes’ apparatus, 
identified with the IS-LM model, as a simplified version of the Walrasian model: 
Thus both the Keynesian and the traditional theory of interest are but two limiting cases of what may be 
regarded to be the general theory of interest. It is a feature of great historical interest that the essentials of this 
general theory are contained already in the work of Walras. (1938, 20) 
And also:  
Thus Mr. Keynes apparatus involves a considerable simplification of the theory. (1938, 23) 
The basis for this interpretation was the belief that Keynes assumed a horizontal supply curve 
for labor (Lange, 1938, 31). This implied that labor market clearing was compatible with 
involuntary unemployment, so that a Keynesian unemployment equilibrium was only a sub-
category of the Walrasian equilibrium. In Price, Flexibility and Employment (1944), Lange 
approached the General Theory from a different angle and argued that to prove the generality 
of Keynes’ chapter 19 one had to restate its conclusions in a complete general equilibrium 
perspective. This approach was inspired by Value and Capital. In the introduction of his 
famous book Hicks announced that he would assess Keynes’ results in the light of the “pure 
logical analysis of capitalism” in order to “[clear] up several important things [Keynes] left 
not very clear” (1946, 4). Retrospectively, this way of approaching Keynes’ works seems far 
from being obvious. Keynes developed the General Theory from within the Marshallian 
tradition, a tradition that displayed a conception of the market more or less incompatible with 
the Walrasian conception2. However, for Hicks (1934, 1939) and Lange (1932) Alfred 
Marshall and Léon Walras’ conceptions of the market were complementary3. 
For different reasons, Hicks and Lange did not probe into the relations between the IS-LM 
model and the temporary equilibrium model that both of them used to discuss Keynes’ ideas. 
In 1939, Hicks did not consider IS-LM as a Walrasian construct. It was the model of the 
                                                 
2
 See Clower (1989) and De Vroey (1999a, 1999b and 2004). 
3
 On Lange’s belief in the complementary between Marshall and Walras see Lendjel (2001). 
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General Theory, a framework which descended from the Marshallian tradition (Hicks, 1937, 
150; 1950, 4). His own approach, developed in Value and capital, was different. Lange did 
write that IS-LM was Walrasian. But his interpretation of Keynes’ unemployment equilibrium 
as a sub-case of the Walrasian equilibrium implied that the foundations of IS-LM were self-
evident and need not be clarified. Finally, for both of them the important task was the 
reformulation of Keynes’ main results in an authentic general equilibrium setting. 
Unlike Hicks and Lange, Patinkin thought that the foundations of the macromodels 
inspired by the General Theory had to be clarified. Following his teacher, Lange, Patinkin 
believed that they could be derived from Walrasian models4. But, unlike him, he realized that 
in order to obtain a Keynesian model, one had to modify substantially the Walrasian 
framework. With hindsight, one may say that Patinkin put his finger on the microfoundation 
issue. He did so from two different angles: first, involuntary unemployment and, second, the 
inconsistency between Samuelson’s representation of the Keynesian theory and the law of 
supply and demand. 
1.2. From involuntary unemployment to the “additional restraint” concept 
The need for microfoundations was one of the basic tenets of the Cowles Commission 
agenda under the directorship of Marschak5. This may explain how Patinkin tackled the 
problem of involuntary unemployment in his thesis. 
Like many Keynesians involved in the neoclassical synthesis, Patinkin was a child of the 
Great Depression6. Hence, even though the choice of his thesis topic was not straightforward, 
it was not totally by chance that, in the end, he started to work on unemployment7. According 
                                                 
4
 One can find an echo of Lange’s interpretation in Patinkin’s article on Keynes in the New Palgrave. There 
he contends that “a basic contribution of the General Theory is that it is in effect the first practical application of 
the Walrasian theory of general equilibrium” (1991, 27). 
5
 “The presentation of these reports was followed (or rather, constantly interrupted) by critical comments, a 
recurrent theme of which was the necessity (emphasized especially by Marschak) for basing the analysis –and 
the resulting empirical equations- on the principle of profit or utility maximization” (Patinkin, 1995, 385) 
6
 “On the other hand, the economic and social problems of the depression were part of our everyday 
experience. My father was in partnership with my uncle in a small business, which succumbed to serious 
financial difficulties. Fathers of close friends of mine had been unemployed for long periods, if not years. When 
we went downtown, we would see World War I veterans sitting at street corners behind up-ended empty fruit 
boxes in the bitter cold of Chicago winters, selling apples and pencils.” (Patinkin, 1995, 360) 
7
 On this see Patinkin (1995, 378-9) and Merhling (2002). 
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to him, unemployment or more precisely involuntary unemployment was “the very question 
that brought forth the General Theory” (1949, 360). Yet, the concept that Keynes had put 
forward in chapter 2 of his book had not been given enough attention.  
After the publication of the General Theory in 1936, a number of economists tried to 
capture Keynes message within formal models of the IS-LM type8. Among them, some, like 
Hicks (1937), completely left aside the concept of involuntary unemployment. The others 
accounted for it by assuming a horizontal supply curve of labor. The main advocate of this 
curve was Lange: 
Involuntary unemployment in the Keynesian sense is not an excess supply of labor but an equilibrium 
position obtained by intersection of a demand and a supply curve, the supply curve of labor, however, being 
infinitely elastic over a wide range with respect to money wages, the point of intersection being to the left of 
the region where elasticity of supply of labor with respect to money wages becomes finite. (Lange, 1944, 6) 
The notion of a “perfectly elastic supply of labor” can also be found in Franco Modigliani’s 
influential 1944 paper on IS-LM.  
The way Patinkin himself tackled this issue was not based on Keynes’ definition of 
involuntary unemployment (Boianovsky, 2006, 209). His starting point was a critique of the 
way Lange and Modigliani defined and represented this concept, a critique that opened the 
way for a rational reconstruction. As he put it in a report to the Social Sciences Research 
Council, which financed his doctoral studies: 
The point taken by my research was that none of the current theories of unemployment had emphasized its 
involuntary aspect. All of them were expressed in terms of demand and supply curve of labor, and workers 
were always ‘on their supply curve’. From my viewpoint this did not represent involuntary unemployment 
since workers were acting precisely as they desired, as represented by their supply curve. (Patinkin, Final 
report for the Social Sciences Research Council, June 1947) 
Here, Patinkin clearly attacked the assumption of a horizontal supply of labor curve. The 
quotation shows that he assimilated the aggregate supply curve of labor and the curve 
expressing an individual workers’ desired supply of labor. Since the labor supply curve 
expressed the preferences of workers, their situation could hardly be called involuntary when 
trade was occurring at the intersection of the demand and the supply schedules, whether the 
latter was horizontal or not. In the conclusion of his dissertation, Patinkin made his point a bit 
differently by highlighting the absurdity of Lange and Modigliani’s approach. In their 
                                                 
8
 See Darity and Young (1995). 
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reasoning, a slight change in the behaviors or workers could turn a situation of “involuntary 
unemployment” into a situation of full employment: 
The artificiality of this definition is sufficiently demonstrated if one considers the case in which the supply 
curve instead of being horizontal in the interval (0, N1), the supply curve rises with a slope of 0.001! (1947, 
115). 
Instead of using Lange’s horizontal curve, Patinkin maintained the assumption of a 
standard “notional” supply of labor function and defined “involuntary unemployment” as a 
situation where workers were “off their supply curve”: “In order to be acting involuntarily, 
[workers] must be off their supply curve” (Final Report to the Social Sciences Research 
Council).  
This approach raised a new problem. How could involuntary unemployment, so defined, 
match with choice theory? “Involuntary” in Patinkin’s “off the curve” sense meant “not 
chosen”. But economic theory only dealt with chosen outcomes. Economic action and 
voluntary action were one and the same thing. To escape this contradiction, Patinkin insisted 
on the relative nature of “involuntary action” and developed the concept of “additional 
restraint”. The fact that unemployed were not “on their curve” did not mean that they were on 
no curve. Though they did not achieve their Walrasian plans, they were still guided by a plan 
but one including “additional restraints”. Their behavior was then “involuntary” as compared 
to the behavior defined by Walrasian plans, plans without additional restraints, reflecting what 
agents “truly” desired”. Unemployed were “coerced” “in a relative sense only”: 
Though the existence of widespread involuntary unemployment is historically irrefutable, economic theory 
has yet to deal adequately with it. Involuntary unemployment involves what might be called ‘relative 
coercion’: people cannot fulfill their desires as freely as under some other situation which serves as a norm of 
reference. Hence in order to give concreteness to the concept of coercion we must first define this norm of 
reference. It is theoretically meaning less to speak of involuntary unemployment without introducing a 
comparison between two alternative models: the actually existing one and some designated norm. I must 
emphasize that I define coercion and freedom in a relative sense only. People acting with the ‘normal’ 
freedom (i.e. under the restrictions to be found in the norm of reference) will (for the sake of brevity) be 
defined as fulfilling their desires freely. People acting under more than the ‘normal’ restrictions will be said 
to be coerced and prevented from fulfilling their desires. In most of what follows our norm of reference is 
defined as a model in which the economic unit is restricted only by the budget restraint and technological 
relationships (e.g. the production function). (1947a, 79) 
The notion of “additional restraint” expressed with remarkable clarity the necessity of 
modifying the Walrasian budget constraint, the “budget restraint” in Patinkin’s language, in 
order to obtain a disequilibrium model out of a Walrasian framework. In the conclusion of his 
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thesis, Patinkin clarified further his thinking and deepened his insight in presenting a 
mathematical formulation of it9. He wrote down a maximization program showing how, in a 
disequilibrium state, agents’ calculus would produce new behavior functions, the gi functions, 
resulting from the combination of a Walrasian budget constraint and an additional constraint. 
These would express simultaneously the fact that agents suffered from rationing and the fact 
that they still had a margin of choice concerning their desired quantities. In this particular 
instance, Patinkin imagined “some sort of rationing control”. This illustration referred to the 
context of World War II, when consumers had to face price controls and rationing. Not being 
able to purchase the desired quantities of some goods, the consumer would have to allocate 
differently his income taking “rationing control” into account. In the ensuing comments, 
Patinkin explained that the same approach could be applied to firms and unemployed workers. 
But if we do apply his approach in the case of unemployed, the gi functions become “effective 
demands” à la Clower (1965) as opposed to the “notional” or Walrasian demands noted hi 
resulting from the budget constraint only: 
In general, for any given set of prices and income, the amount purchased, as given by gi, will differ from that 
given by hi. So even though the consumer may be on his gi function, he is not fulfilling his desires; for the 
desires of the individual are defined as being represented by his fi [sic] functions. 
In a similar fashion, application of an additional restriction to the maximization procedures of firms and 
workers may still leave them free to maximize utility or profit. In this case, too, even though the worker is on 
a curve (of the type (62.7)), he is not on the one he “really” desires. […]. Therefore we can still distinguish 
between N’Sr and NSr. (1947, 118) 
All these elements show that by 1947 Patinkin had realized that to account for involuntary 
unemployment one had to modify the standard theory of choice and that the main 
modification concerned agents’ constraints. Yet, all we have at this stage is the ideal-type of a 
theory of choice in disequilibrium. Patinkin still had to give an operational content to his 
general insight. He had to apply it to the behavior of firms and consumers in disequilibrium 
and see if it could help him elaborate a Keynesian model.10 
                                                 
9
 See the appendix. 
10
 As shown by Boianovsky (2006, 206-8), another source of Patinkin’s notion of additional restraint may 
have been his dissatisfaction with the mathematical representation of the formation of general equilibrium in 
Lange (1944) and Samuelson (1941) expressed in a 1946 manuscript. At this stage Patinkin ignored tâtonnement 
and its recontracting assumption. For him, whenever there was a gap between supply and demand some agents 
had to be “off their curve”, a fact that was not captured by Samuelson’s differential equations. 
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1.3. The diagonal cross diagram with flexible prices 
As an historian of economic thought, later in his career, Patinkin identified the 
equilibrating effect of output variations as the “major novel feature of the General Theory and 
its central message” (1982, 11). This point was illustrated by Samuelson’s 1939 diagonal 
cross diagram. Patinkin also made extensive use of this Samuelsonian representation of the 
goods market in Money, Interest and Prices. The reader of the thesis realizes that he 
interpreted Samuelson’s theory of income determination as the core of the Keynesian theory 
as early as 1947. This conception probably derived from Lange’s teaching and a careful 
reading of Samuelson’s 1941 paper on the “Stability of Equilibrium”. In this text, Samuelson 
analyzed the stability of an IS-LM model where the rate of interest and income were the 
adjusting variables. The price level and its variations were totally absent from this 
representation of the Keynesian theory. The foundations of such a model were not obvious. 
Two approaches were possible. One could assume that wages and prices were both fixed, the 
option that Hansen (1953) would choose. The models of Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944) 
offered a second option. They presented money income as the variable adjusting savings and 
investment. But in their models, money income adjusted only because price variations 
modified the labor demand and firms’ output (at least up to full employment where pure 
inflation became the only cause of the increase in money income). In other words, nominal 
wages being rigid, the level of prices was the underlying variable adjusting aggregate supply 
and aggregate demand11.  
But another key aspect of Patinkin’s interpretation of the Keynesian theory was his 
rejection of the assumption of wage rigidity and, a fortiori, price rigidity. This point is not 
discussed explicitly in the thesis. The reader can see only that such assumptions are nowhere 
introduced. Patinkin’s correspondence clarifies his position. 
In “Liquidity Preference and the Theory of Money and Interest” (1944) Franco Modigliani 
offered an alternative to the interpretation of the Keynesian theory based on the liquidity trap 
argued by Hicks (1937) and by Lange (1938). He maintained that the characteristic 
assumption of Keynes’ theory was the assumption of downward nominal wage rigidity: 
It is usually considered as one of the most important achievements of the Keynesian theory that it explains 
the consistency of economic equilibrium with the presence of involuntary unemployment. It is, however, not 
sufficiently recognized that, except in a limiting case to be considered later, this result is due entirely to the 
assumption of ‘rigid wages’ and not to the Keynesian liquidity preference. (1944, 65) 
                                                 
11
 For a similar interpretation see Dutt (2002, 332). 
10 
 
This approach laid down the standard meaning of the adjective “Keynesian”. Yet, it did not 
convince Patinkin. The reason was stated very clearly in a letter written in April of 1948 to 
Franco Modigliani: 
Now, if the whole purpose of Keynes is to say that with rigid wages we can have unemployment 
‘equilibrium’, I really do not see his contribution. This is a point that would have been admitted by classical 
economists themselves, but Keynes (on page 12, line 9 and following) seems to argue that the classical 
position on this point was wrong : that there could be unemployment for other reasons. (Patinkin, 1948, 2) 
According to Patinkin, the explanation of unemployment through wage rigidity was the 
classical one. If this explanation was ascribed to Keynes, then the General Theory brought 
nothing new. Therefore, a Keynesian theory had to demonstrate that unemployment was not 
due to wage rigidity but to ‘other reasons’. 
Patinkin found these reasons in the work of Klein. He wrote, in his “Training of an 
Economist”, that during his stay at the Cowles Commission “there were stimulating 
discussions with Lawrence Klein on the manuscript of his then forthcoming Keynesian 
Revolution (1947)” (1995, 385). In this book, Klein argued that the characteristic assumptions 
of the Keynesian model were that investment and savings were “interest inelastic” or 
“insensitive” in respect to variations of the rate of interest. Given these assumptions, he 
asserted that an IS-LM model with flexible prices and wages could have no equilibrium 
solution. The problem, in this setting, came from the fact that equilibrium of savings and 
investment for a full employment income could imply a negative rate of interest. Yet such a 
negative value was excluded. As a result, the aggregate demand remained less than the 
aggregate supply of goods. Klein interpreted this result as a demonstration of the incapacity of 
the market system to guarantee a perfect coordination of economic activities. But such a 
situation described a “hyper-deflationary” system and was not realistic. Therefore, he 
introduced wage rigidity in his model to guarantee the existence of an unemployment 
equilibrium. Still, the exogenous wage was not the cause of unemployment in his model: “In 
the Keynesian system lower wages need not do any good” (Klein, 1947, 87). Given the 
psychology of households and entrepreneurs, there was no equilibrium of savings and 
investment compatible with full employment. Hence, even with the exogenous wage reduced 
to zero, full employment would not be restored. 
Klein was a major source of inspiration for Patinkin’s thesis. But while he adopted his 
explanation of involuntary unemployment, he dismissed his Keynesian version of IS-LM. 
Patinkin actually jumped from the idea that involuntary unemployment was not a 
consequence of money-wage rigidity to the contention that wage rigidity, and a fortiori price 
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rigidity, had to be excluded from the Keynesian theory. In other words, this theory had to 
demonstrate that a perfectly competitive system with price and wage flexibility could suffer 
from chronic unemployment. His correspondence offers clear evidence in support of this 
interpretation, as the following passage taken from a letter to Wassily Leontief illustrates: 
The second issue, and one with which, as I understand it, Keynes is really concerned is: Is a wage decrease 
the way to solve the problem of unemployment? The Classical answer is yes; Keynes’ answer is no for 
reasons which he sets out in chapter 19 of the General Theory. (…). This position can be maintained without 
assuming wage rigidity. In fact, what it says is that despite wage flexibility, full employment will not be 
restored. (Patinkin to Leontief, 21 February 1950). 
This position was probably inspired by Lange. His 1944 book on Price Flexibility and 
Employment focused on chapter 19 of the General Theory and reinterpreted Keynes’ question 
as a stability issue. It started from a situation in which the economic system was in excess 
supply on the labour market and studied whether the adjustment of wages and prices would 
take it to a general equilibrium state. In this perspective, the Keynesian message did not 
depend on an assumed rigidity of wages. Evidence of Lange’s influence on this point can be 
found in the notes taken by Don Patinkin during his courses. For instance, in Patinkin’s 
notebook from the course on business cycle theory, one can read: “So in Keynesian system 
for permanent unemployment don’t need rigid wages” (Business Cycle Theory, Summer 
1945: 96, Patinkin’s emphasis).  
To conclude, when Patinkin wrote his thesis, his representation of the Keynesian theory 
was Samuelson’s diagonal cross diagram combined with flexible prices and flexible wages. 
But Samuelson’s interpretation of the effective demand principle, featuring income as the 
adjusting variable, was at variance with the law of supply and demand, a principle reigning 
over Lange’s 1944 analysis. How could one reconcile both adjustment mechanisms? How 
could one articulate the diagonal cross diagram and the general equilibrium theory without 
assuming wage or price rigidity? 
2. The macroeconomics of “inconsistent systems” 
Starting from the preceding ingredients, the Walrasian perspective, the problem of 
involuntary unemployment and the ambition to find something better than IS-LM with rigid 
wages, Patinkin developed a bold construction. His theory would show that when the price 
mechanism did not lead the economic system towards general equilibrium in the Walrasian 
meaning of the terms, a distinct kind of equilibrium would emerge out of a bargaining 
12 
 
process. This competing general equilibrium concept would feature simultaneously 
involuntary unemployment and flexible prices. 
2.1. Microfoundations of the classical macromodel and origins of unemployment 
In the introduction of the second part of his thesis, on involuntary unemployment, Patinkin 
stated that his “first task [would] be the formation (by aggregation) of these macromodels 
from the Casselian equations previously considered” (1947, 51) 12. In other words, Patinkin’s 
intended to derive his macromodels from a Walrasian one. To begin with, he explained how 
to derive individual demand functions including money income as one of their components13. 
Then he contended that his analysis offered the basis to obtain a “Casselian system of 
equations”, a set of n equilibrium conditions of the type supply of commodity i equals 
demand. The aggregation of the supply and demand functions of this system was then 
supposed to give rise to the following classical macromodel: 
XD = G( Y, r)  (1) 
XS = η  (2) 
XD = XS  (3) 
Y = XS  (4) 
B( r, p, Y) = 0 (5) 
M( r, p, Y) = 0 (6) 
The function XD defined the aggregate demand for goods. It increased in respect to income 
and decreased in respect to the rate of interest. Patinkin ignored the “Pigou effect” for 
theoretical as well as empirical reasons14. The aggregate supply of goods was constant. It 
represented the full employment supply derived from the labor market equilibrium. 
Eventually, the aggregate income was defined by the aggregate supply. Equations (5) and (6) 
                                                 
12
 Or “My interest is in moving from the semi-microequations to the macroequations which play so 
prominent a role in current economic discussion” (Patinkin, 1947, 57). 
13
 More on this point below. 
14
 Patinkin justified this neglect stating that “whatever empirical evidence does exist lends little support to 
[Pigou’s] hypothesis” (1947, 73). For the theoretical reason and Patinkin’s evolution on this point see Rubin 
(2005).  
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are respectively the condition for equilibrium on the market for bonds and the condition for 
equilibrium on the market for money. 
Following Klein (1947), Patinkin intended to show that this classical system could be 
“inconsistent” or that it could have no equilibrium solution:  
The argument is made that the cause of this inconsistency is the insensitivity of savings and investment to 
fluctuations in the interest rate. This insensitivity creates a situation in which there exists (potentially) more 
savings at the full employment level than can be offset by investments. Hence this full employment level 
cannot be brought into existence. (Patinkin, 1947, 51) 
In terms of the above system, this amounted to say that the equilibrium condition on the goods 
market η = G( η, r) might imply a negative rate of interest15. Such a rate was deemed 
incompatible with equation (6) for it would have entailed an infinite demand for money. In 
other words, the equilibrium condition on the market for money implied the condition r ≥ 0.  
By definition, in a system without full employment solution, price and wage flexibility 
could not bring back full employment. In his dissertation, Patinkin interpreted this result as 
demonstrating that the problem of involuntary unemployment was inherent to the classical 
system, which represented a perfectly competitive market economy: 
If the worker is unemployed, it is not because he wants to be, but because the basic inconsistency of the 
system makes it impossible to satisfy his desires. (Patinkin, 1947, 116) 
This was only the first stage in the elaboration of Patinkin’s theory of involuntary 
unemployment.  
2.2. Unemployment equilibrium: the “macroeconomic” approach 
For Patinkin, a model without an equilibrium solution could “not describe the real world” 
(1947: 78). Therefore, the classical model had to be amended to obtain an unemployment 
equilibrium. But he refused to resort to the assumption of wage rigidity and put forward 
instead what he coined as a “theory of compromise”. 
a) The determination of employment on the market for goods 
In order to develop his unemployment theory, Patinkin started from a simplified classical 
model. The economist still claimed to deal with a monetary economy but eliminated the rate 
                                                 
15
 Note that Patinkin, like Klein (1947), did not distinguish between the money rate and the real rate of 
interest and implicitly assumed that the expected rate of inflation was nil. 
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of interest from the demand for goods16. Variations of monetary aggregates did not affect the 
markets for goods and labor so the equations for the bonds and the money markets could be 
put aside. The system consisted of equations (2), (3), (4) and (7):  
XD = XD(Y)  (7) 
Patinkin used Samuelson’s diagonal-cross diagram to illustrate his theory. From this point 
of view, one defect of Keynes’ theory was that it ignored the global supply of goods as 
derived from the equilibrium on the labor market (1947, 87). Once this supply side was 
reintroduced in the model, the inconsistency pointed earlier could appear clearly. Supply, 
corresponding to the equation XS = η, was represented by a vertical line on the diagram: 
 
Figure 1 (Patinkin, 1947, 83) 
The fact that the supply curve and the demand curve did not cut the bisecting line on the same 
point illustrated the absence of equilibrium. 
According to Patinkin the initial “inconsistent system” determined two distinct values for 
income. The first one, η, was defined by the labor market clearing or by the “subsystem” (2), 
(3) and (4). It expressed the income “desired” by the suppliers of goods. The second one, 
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 “Let us now consider the real part of the system and see what happens when it becomes overdetermined. 
For this purpose I assume that r does not enter the expenditure function.” (Patinkin, 1947, 82) 
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defined by the equation Y =F(Y) or by the “subsystem” (7), (3) and (4), was the income Y1 on 
figure 1. This value expressed the income “desired” by the buyers of goods. In order to 
account for the existence of an equilibrium with unemployment, Patinkin introduced his 
“theory of compromise”. He explained that when such “disagreement” occurred between the 
two sides of the market, a “compromise” had to be reached the outcome of which depended 
on the respective “bargaining powers” of suppliers and demanders17. The stronger the 
“bargaining power” of demanders, the nearer to their desired income they would get. Thus, a 
priori, the equilibrium income could take any value between the full employment income and 
the income determined by the outlet constraint. Happily enough, according to Patinkin, in the 
“normal situation” and in a case of excess supply, the demanders were the one to lay down 
their conditions: 
Assume, for example, that suppliers have no bargaining power. This means that buyers need make no 
compromise and can force the suppliers to accept the level of Y which they (the buyers) desire. (…). I 
believe this to be a description of the normal situation in our economy. It should be emphasized that this 
superior bargaining power implies no personal relationship between buyers and sellers. It is reflected by the 
simple institutional fact that as a rule buyers can obtain anything they want, and cannot be forced to purchase 
anything they do not; suppliers, on the other hand, are not always free to sell the entire amount they desire. 
They are frequently restricted by a “limited market”. (1947, 84) 
A measure of unemployment could then be given by the difference between η and Y1. η 
being considered as the « norm of reference » or the full employment income.  
It was at this stage of the thesis that Patinkin touched upon the fundamental issue raised by 
Samuelson’s diagram. How did it square with the standard price mechanism? The 
introduction of an aggregate supply curve into the diagram revealed the problem18. What 
appeared as an equilibrium in the standard Keynesian presentation became a disequilibrium 
situation: 
The failure of Keynes and his followers to discuss the issue in terms of overdeterminacy was due to the fact 
that they almost never introduced the supply curve explicitly into the discussion. (1947, 87) 
According to Patinkin, the Keynesian adjustment mechanism was justified because the law of 
supply and demand failed to clear the markets. This mechanism was now founded on his 
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 This approach was also inspired by Klein (1947, 87) who referred to the “superior bargaining power of the 
employer over the employee” to explain why “workers will not remain on their supply curve of labor”.  
18
 For a detailed analysis of Patinkin’s contribution to the theory of aggregate supply see Boianovsky (2002).  
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theory of compromise. Though on the goods market and in a “normal situation” this boiled 
down to a short side condition. 
b) The determination of the real wage on the labor market 
Patinkin presented the preceding model in chapter 7 of the thesis. He analyzed the situation 
that this model implied on the labor market in chapter 9. Whereas chapter 7 presented the 
compromise between the group of buyers and the group of sellers, chapter 9 was about the 
compromise between firms and workers19. The model finally consisted of equations (2), (3), 
(4), (7) plus the following equations: 
Y = Φ(N) (8) 
(W/P)1 = Φ’(N) (9) 
(W/P)2 = Π(N) (10) 
W/P = γ.Π(N) + (1 – γ).Φ’(N) (11) 
Once output was determined, equations (9), (10) and (11) determined the equilibrium real 
wage. The “theory of compromise” was again at work. In a “normal” economic situation, 
income was fixed by the demand for goods. To this income corresponded a certain level of 
employment given by the production function. There were two different real wages in these 
conditions. The real wage defined by the labor demand curve (equation 9) was the maximum 
available to workers hence the one they desired. Inversely, the real wage defined by the labor 
supply equation was the minimum that workers would accept hence the one desired by firms. 
This disagreement called for a compromise. As in the preceding case, the outcome depended 
on the “bargaining powers” of both parties. Equation (11) summarizes the formalization 
proposed by Patinkin. The parameter γ indicated firms’ “bargaining power”. The bigger it was 
the nearer firms got to the minimum wage. But, if an agreement was reached, γ also indicated 
the “bargaining power” of workers. If γ was small the workers got a real wage near the one 
they desire. This key parameter determined the equilibrium real wage like a weighted average 
of the wages desired by the two sides of the market. This analysis was illustrated by figure 2: 
                                                 
19
 In chapters 6 and 7, Patinkin actually referred to an economy of “individuals” producers and consumers 
alike whereas in chapter 8 and 9 he distinguished between, firms and workers. But in spite of this discontinuity 
in the verbal presentation, formally, the model of chapter 9 was only an extension of the models of chapter 6 and 
7. 
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Figure 2 (Patinkin, 1947, 102) 
On the basis of this diagram, Patinkin examined whether the best measure of 
unemployment was U = N3 – N0 or U = ν - N0. The former was preferred because it carried 
with it the notion of involuntary action. After that, Patinkin analyzed the effect of a change in 
the bargaining power γ on employment and the real wage. He showed that in a system where 
the propensity to spend of workers was higher than the propensity to spend of employers, a 
rise of workers bargaining power would increase both the real wage and the employment 
level. 
2.3. Unemployment equilibrium: the “microeconomic” approach 
In chapter 8 of his Ph.D. thesis, entitled “Unemployment and inconsistent systems: 
microeconomics”, Patinkin undertook to develop the microeconomic counterpart of his 
macroeconomic model20. The approach was microeconomic in a double meaning. First, the 
model was multisectoral. Second, Patinkin detailed agents’ maximization programs. The 
purpose of the multisectoral structure was to show how unemployment was spread among 
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industries and workers21. Since Patinkin’s results on this matter are not compelling22, we will 
not alter very much the substance of his reasoning by dealing with an aggregate version of his 
model. The clarification of agent’s maximization program served another aim. Patinkin 
wanted to show the role played by his concept of “additional restraint” in his theory of 
involuntary unemployment:  
I must be clear at the outset that the present chapter [chapter 8] is not intended to be a description of the real 
world. Its primary purpose is to be a rigorous exercise in the use of the concepts introduced in section 38 [the 
section defining involuntary action as action under additional restraint]. Through this chapter I hope (a) to 
define precisely the meaning of action under additional restraints, (b) to emphasize the relativity of the 
concept of unemployment to the norm by which it is measured, and (c) to introduce explicitly the role of 
bargaining power in the economic system. (1947, 88). 
Last but not least, the economist believed that it was “more meaningful to have the 
compromise between employers and workers” (1947, 88). Therefore, in contrast with his 
“macroeconomic” model, the “microeconomic” model focused exclusively on the labor 
market. 
The classical model used as a benchmark in chapter 8 shared the simplifications introduced 
to deal with the Keynesian macroeconomic model. But the equilibrium condition for the labor 
market was now explicit. The model consisted of equations (3), (4), (7), (12) and (13).  
Y = F(N) (12) 
NS(W/P) = ND(W/P) = N (13) 
At this stage of his presentation, Patinkin did not mention the money market. But we can 
assume that he implicitly put it aside owing to Walras’ law. This being said, his system was 
clearly “inconsistent”. Save a happy coincidence, equations (3), (4), (7) and the subsystem 
(12)-(13) would determine two different values for real income and the system would have no 
solution. There remained to analyze the functioning of the system in disequilibrium. In 
Patinkin’s language, one had to elaborate a theory of compromise. 
Given Patinkin’s approach, the definition of the disequilibrium configuration of his system 
was a difficult task. In order to determine agents’ notional demands, Patinkin may have 
started from an arbitrary price vector. In other words in might have imagined some kind of 
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 “The system is incomplete until we show how this unemployment is spread among the different workers” 
(Patinkin, 1947, 88).  
22
 The repartition of unemployed between sectors was determined by exogenous parameters. 
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non-tâtonnement process. But the notion of tâtonnement was absent from the thesis. And 
probably because he refused to assume price rigidity, Patinkin found a different way out. He 
solved the difficulty by using a procedure similar to the one he employed in his 
“macroeconomic” analysis. He built two subsystems out of his classical model, each one now 
being supposed to determine a real wage and an employment level. The idea was the 
following. The Walrasian model was overdetermined, it contained one equation too many. 
Hence, Patinkin abandoned the equilibrium condition for the labor market. Then he 
considered two cases. In the first one, he assumed that “workers direct the economy” (1947, 
91). The latter calculated a real wage that would equilibrate the market for goods assuming 
that production was a function of the labor supply. In the second one, “employers control the 
economy” (1947, 92). Like workers, firms calculated a real wage that would equilibrate the 
market for goods assuming this time that production was a function of labor demand. The first 
sub-system, called “workers’ model”, determined a level of employment noted Ne considered 
by Patinkin as the level desired by workers or the “full employment level”. The second sub-
system, called “employers’ model”, determined Nf, considered by Patinkin as the level of 
employment desired by firms. The comparison of both magnitudes was supposed to measure 
the degree of “inconsistency” of the classical system: “In general, Nf will be different from 
Ne” (Patinkin, 1947: 92). In practice Patinkin assumed that Nf < Ne. With hindsight, the 
configuration studied by Patinkin was one of equilibrium on the goods market, excess supply 
on the labor market and excess demand on the money market.  
I can use my simplified version of his model to illustrate Patinkin’s approach. But this 
immediately reveals a key ambiguity of his presentation. In the introduction of chapter 8, 
Patinkin wrote explicitly that agents’ demands for goods were supposed to be the Walrasian 
demands:  
I will assume that no matter what happens consumers will be able to fulfill their desires, and will not have to 
compromise. This means that the second step in the maximization of utility (cf. above, section 28) proceeds 
unhindered and need not be considered in microeconomic detail. Consequently we can assume that 
individuals as consumers have already maximized utility to yield the demand functions for the product of 
each industry. (1947, 89) 
Walrasian demands for goods should have been functions of the relative prices of the system 
and in particular of the real wage. But when Patinkin wrote down the equations defining the 
demands for goods in chapters 6, 7 and 8, he presented them as functions of Y or N, the 
effective levels of output and employment, just like our equation (7). In other words, Patinkin 
did not distinguish between Walrasian demands and standard Keynesian demand functions. If 
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we interpret his aggregate demand function as a Keynesian one, the following results obtain. 
To begin with, equation (13) was put aside. Then, in the “workers’ model”, the labor supply 
function was introduced in the production function and the production function replaced 
income in the equilibrium condition for the goods market. The result was an equation giving 
an equilibrium real wage (equation 14) and, consequently, the levels of employment and 
production (equations 15 and 16): 
F [NS(W/P)] = XD{F [NS(W/P)]} (14) 
Ne = NS(W/P) (15) 
Y = F (NS) (16) 
In order to obtain the “employers’ model”, Patinkin used the same procedure with labor 
demand replacing labor supply: 
F [ND(W/P)] = XD{F [ND(W/P)]} (17) 
Nf = ND(W/P) (18) 
Y = F(ND) (19) 
Retrospectively, one realizes that, interpreted in this way, Patinkin’s approach would have 
suffered from a serious flaw. The way he presented them did not modify the fact that the 
adjustment variable of equations (14) and (17) was still real income Y. As a consequence, the 
two sub-systems would determine the same income and the same level of employment, Y1 and 
N0, the solutions of the Keynesian macroeconomic model. The supply price of labor and the 
demand price did differ but the Patinkin’s procedure failed to measure unemployment defined 
as a gap between Ne and Nf. A second interpretation is possible though. If we take into 
account Patinkin’s intention and forget the way he wrote down his demand functions, his 
procedure proves to be valid. Once equation (7) is replaced by a function of the real wage, the 
“workers’ model” and the “employers’ model” can give rise to two distinct levels of 
employment with Ne < Nf. 
After having characterized the situation of the economy by measuring the gap between Ne 
and Nf, Patinkin used his “theory of compromise” to define the transactions agents realized on 
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the labor market23. The level of transactions was determined by the respective bargaining 
powers of agents: 
ND = Nf + α
 
(Ne – Nf)  (20) 
NS = Ne + β
 
(Nf – Ne) (21) 
ND = NS if, and only if α+ β = 1 (22) 
As indicated by equation (20) firms would employ a quantity of labor equal to α(Ne – Nf) in 
addition to their desired labor demand Nf. Patinkin called α the “compromise coefficients” of 
firms. The greater this coefficient the more firms “took into account the overall desires” of the 
workers group (1947: 93). In the same way, the quantity of labor supplied by workers was a 
function of their desired labor supply and of their “coefficient of compromise” β. Equation 
(22) defined the equilibrium condition for transactions: it showed that “for the successful 
functioning of the economy, it is necessary that the sum of compromise coefficients cover the 
difference submitted to compromise” (1947, 93). 
Since transactions determined by the “theory of compromise” did not coincide with the 
transactions desired by agents, they implied the existence of ex-post constraints that had to be 
introduced in agents’ decision programs: 
Assume that a successful compromise is reached. We can now consider [(20)] and [(21)] as additional 
restrictions on the maximization procedure of firms and workers. (1947, 93) 
Firms maximized the following objective function:  
PY – WND – λ1[Y – F(N)] – λ2[ND - Nf +α (Ne – Nf)]. (23) 
And workers maximized :    
U(WN/P, L) - µ1(NS + L – T) + µ2[NS - Ne + β (Nf – Ne)] (24) 
Patinkin decomposed households’ choice in two stages. In the first stage they chose between 
“real income” WN/P and leisure L given a constant amount of time T. In the second stage only 
they decided how to “allocate their income among different purchases” (1947, 53). 
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 “The model Q1 and Q2 are hypothetical models whose primary purpose is to define the constants [ND], 
[NS], Ne, and Nf. But they do not attempt to “describe the real world;” for this purpose we would have to 
construct a third consistent model, Q3” (1947, 92) 
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The fact that the “additional restraint” imposed by the compromise on the labor market 
impinged on consumers choice and implied an effective demand for goods distinct from the 
notional demand was not seen by Patinkin. Writing down agents’ maximizing program was 
important mainly because it showed that they acted “involuntarily”: 
In the terminology of section 38, these additional restraints (i.e., additional to the budget identity and 
production function) mean that firms and workers are being coerced. They are being forced to compromise, 
and prevented from fulfilling their desires. (1947, 94) 
Once the level of employment was determined, and the involuntary nature of actions 
clarified, output, the demand for goods and the real wage were supposed to be determined 
respectively by the production function, the notional demand function for goods and the 
equilibrium condition on the market for goods. Here, the ambiguity pointed out above 
resurfaced. In Patinkin’s Keynesian model only one level of employment was compatible with 
the condition Y = XD(Y) and nothing assured that the employment level resulting from the 
bargaining procedure would be compatible with equilibrium on the goods market. If Patinkin 
had seen this he might have imagined a second round of negotiation on the market for goods, 
a negotiation that would have settled the level of employment. 
Once he had presented the general structure of his model, Patinkin elaborated upon his 
theory of compromise. Each agent was endowed with a “compromise coefficient”. αij was the 
coefficient of firm i in industry j and βijk the coefficient of worker k in firm i of industry j. On 
this basis he discussed the role of social conflict in the attainment of equilibrium. The sum of 
coefficients α and β might not be equal to one. This meant that firms and workers failed to 
compromise and that the system “ceases to function” (1947, 97): 
Then the indivuals might attempt to influence the αij and the βijk of the others to make them more willing to 
compromise. Thus resort may be had to strikes or lockouts, violent or peaceful. Or one group may succeed in 
getting Congress to pass laws in its favour (e.g. laws for or against collective bargaining, unions, etc.). (…). 
In extreme cases one of the groups may resort to revolution to force the others to compromise. The whole 
system then breaks down until the new realignment of powers is settled. (1947, 97) 
Compromise coefficients were supposed to reflect “institutional factors”. Younger workers 
and unorganized workers would have higher compromise coefficient than older workers and 
members of unions and would have to accept more unemployment. But a conflict might also 
appear between the workers themselves about the distribution of employment. Patinkin also 
presented a model in which the compromise was being determined at the industry level. 
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Although Patinkin devoted a lot of attention to the careful exposition of his theory of 
compromise, this attempt to graft conflict and class struggle onto a Walrasian framework did 
not convince the members of the Cowles Commission. 
3. Appraising the thesis: Cowles Commission members on the theory of compromise 
The reports made on the drafts of the thesis by the members of the Cowles Commission 
criticized heavily his theory of unemployment. Jacob Marschak, the chairman of his thesis 
committee, Tjalling Koopmans, then a Research associate, Herbert Simon, who had just been 
engaged as a Study Co-Director, and Hans Neisser from the New School, who had been asked 
for comments by Marschak, all pointed to the shortcomings of Patinkin’s “theory of 
compromise”. 
First, they criticized Patinkin’s demonstration of the classical system’s inconsistency and 
the idea that such a demonstration could be considered as a “theory of involuntary 
unemployment”. For Neisser, an inconsistent system was simply wrong hence vacuous: 
“Inconsistency indicates that something is wrong with the system, but it is not a guide to what 
is wrong” (H. Neisser, Some Notes on Don Patinkin’s on the Consistency of Economic 
Models, 17 july 1947, 7). 
Second, they rejected the general method he followed in order to define realized 
transactions. One could not define equilibrium quantities by way of a “compromise” between 
the equilibrium quantities of two heterogeneous models or Patinkin’s “subsystems”. An 
economist had to build a consistent model starting from agents’ behaviors. As put by 
Koopmans: 
The real world is not overdetermined. The task of the economist is not to work out a compromise between 
two logically incompatible theories, but to construct a realistic and consistent theory. This requires specifying 
what choices are left to each individual or group of individuals. (Koopmans, Comments on D. P. Theory of 
Unemployment, March 1947) 
Third, they all stressed that his theory of compromise referred to a world of imperfect 
competition and was thus irrelevant in the context of a perfectly competitive system like the 
one he wanted to study. Besides, if imperfect competition was introduced, agents’ 
maximization programs would have to be adapted accordingly which was not the case in 
Patinkin’s thesis. Koopmans, Marschak and Simon all insisted on this point: 
“2. Is not the theory of compromise and bargaining power beside the point? While bargaining power is a very 
important phenomenon of the real world, it does not exist in a perfectly competitive system. (…). And if 
24 
 
phenomena of imperfect competition like bargaining strength are introduced, this would require a 
modification of the equation of competitive behavior, rather that a compromise in the form of weighted 
average of the solutions of two incompatible competitive equation systems” (Marschak, Comments on D. P. 
Unemployment in Keynesian Systems, December 1946). 
But it is not clear whether you think of workers and employers as individuals or as groups. In the latter case, 
the theory of imperfect competition would be needed to specify the choices open to each party and so 
“explain” unemployment” (Koopmans, Comments on D. P. Theory of Unemployment, March 1947) 
The whole idea of bargaining power introduced here is mystical. How and why do they bargain? The only 
way to bargain in a competitive system is by changing your offer. (H. A. Simon, march 19, 1947, 
Memorandum, 3) 
Finally, Koopmans and Simon pointed out the ad hoc character of the theory of 
compromise and the arbitrariness of the whole construction: 
You introduce ‘institutional’ coefficients α, β, which are not further reduced to behavior patterns of 
individuals, as the essential determinants of unemployment. This is not a theory, but a definition. (Koopmans, 
Comments on D. P. Theory of Unemployment, March 1947) 
There is an arbitrariness underlying the whole approach. (H. A. Simon, march 19, 1947, Memorandum, 1) 
The critiques that the members of the Cowles Commission addressed to the thesis must 
have deeply shaken Patinkin. Yet, they failed to help him find his way out of the theory of 
compromise. The suggestion to elaborate upon imperfect competition theories was clearly at 
odds with Patinkin’s aim, for he wanted to show that unemployment could appear even in the 
context of a perfectly competitive system. Simon suggested that he developed his 
unemployment theory along dynamic lines. The model would have been a set of differential 
equations specifying how prices and wages changed when excess supply characterised both 
the goods and the labor market. But this did not answer the basic issue raised by the thesis. 
How could one account for the fact that agents were off their supply curves? Worst of all, 
Cowles Commissioners missed the basic flaw of Patinkin’s theory of unemployment. What he 
had presented as an equilibrium unemployment was not so. For as a result of the 
simplifications he had introduced, money prices and the rate of interest remained 
indeterminate. And as long as excess supplies were supposed to dominate the markets for 
goods and labor, wages and prices should fall. Only after the submission of the thesis did 
Patinkin understand the problem. The draft of a paper probably written during this period 
bears evidence of this realization. In this text, Patinkin still clung to the explanation of 
unemployment in terms of an “inconsistency”, but the presentation of his model was now 
accompanied by the following qualification: 
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First, this unemployment situation cannot be an equilibrium situation; for from (9.2) we see that the price 
level will keep on changing and will never settle down as long as there remains any unemployment. 
(Patinkin, Inconsistent Systems and Involuntary Unemployment ,1948?, 27) 
Patinkin’s thesis put forward a new research program. But its definition was still confused 
and the resulting theory very awkward. Cowles Commissioners were able to point out this 
awkwardness but they did not understand the consistency and the relevance of his undertaking 
behind the flaws. 
4. Appraising the thesis: the concept of additional restraint in retrospect 
Patinkin tried to elaborate a disequilibrium theory, a theory showing how agents could fail 
to complete their desired plans when markets did not clear, and this on the basis of a 
Walrasian model. In doing this, he identified the main modification necessary to turn a 
Walrasian model into a disequilibrium model: the modification of the Walrasian budget 
constraint. In Patinkin’s language, agents in disequilibrium acted under “additional restraints”. 
With hindsight, it appears that Patinkin and the members of the Cowles Commission missed 
the implications of this idea. We must try to understand why Patinkin could not put his finger 
on the key concepts of the disequilibrium theories of the 1970’s, the “spillover effect”, that he 
would elaborate in latter works, and Clower’s “dual decision hypothesis”, although all the 
elements for such a discovery seemed to be on the table. Why did he fail to give an 
operational content to his notion of choice under additional restraint? Analytical mistakes 
played an important role in this false start.  
4.1. Firms  
In Money, Interest and Prices (1956), Patinkin applied and developed an analysis of 
“intermarket pressures” introduced in a 1952 article about “The Limitations of Samuelson’s 
‘Correspondence Principle’”. As he put it in chapter 10 (1956, 157), an excess demand on one 
market could “spillover” on other markets and affect directly their prices. For when 
individuals could not buy all they want on one market, they would try to use their unspent 
funds to buy other commodities. Symmetrically, when firms could not sell all their 
production, they would limit their purchases and in particular their labor demand (1956, 217). 
This way, an excess supply on the goods market would “spillover” on the labor market. 
Clower (1965, 113) renamed Patinkin’s “intermarket pressure” the “spillover effect”. The 
expression was then used by Grossman (1971, 948), who tried to elaborate a “theory of 
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spillover” with “a choice theoretic basis”, and played a crucial role in the literature on 
disequilibrium that developed in the early 1970s. 
A notable feature of Patinkin’s 1947 theory of unemployment is that, although his 
Keynesian macromodel did feature a spillover effect, he did not bring out this concept. His 
analysis contained the notion of voluntary exchange. Faced with a sales constraint on the 
goods market, producers adjusted their production to the demand for goods independently of 
the real wage. The level of output resulting from the short side adjustment on the goods 
market determined the employment level on the labor market. This employment level was 
expressed by equation N0 = φ-1 (Y1) and appeared as a vertical line on figure 2. The excess 
supply on the goods market led to an excess supply on the labor market. Furthermore, 
involuntary unemployment appeared although the real wage was inferior, not superior, to the 
equilibrium real wage, a point on which Patinkin would insist again in chapter 13 of Money, 
Interest and Prices and that would impress Barro and Grossman (1971, 83)24. 
Now, even though the model featured a spillover effect, Patinkin failed to theorize it. The 
main reason for this was his lack of attention to the interaction between the goods market and 
the labor market. I must recall the reader that my presentation in section 2.2 gathered pieces 
of analysis that were presented in two different chapters of the dissertation. In chapter 7, 
Patinkin explained the determination of income on the goods market and in chapter 9 he 
explained the determination of the real wage on the labor market. So, whereas in chapter 13 of 
Money, Interest and Prices he centered the discussion on the interaction between the two 
markets, in 1947 he did not analyze explicitly this interaction. 
In his dissertation, Patinkin could have even gone further than he did in Money, Interest 
and Prices. In his book, Patinkin would point out that the level of the aggregate demand XD 
imposed a new constraint on firms’ choice and he would identify the vertical line N0 as firms’ 
effective demand for labor well distinct from their notional demand (1956, 219). But at the 
same time, in a famous footnote (1956, footnote 9, 220), he presented this result as a puzzle 
without solution and did not go beyond his verbal exposition of the problem25. In the thesis, 
on the basis of his representation of firms maximization program and of his analysis of the 
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 “The assumption of the previous section is that in times of unemployment, there is no a priori reason to 
expect the real wage to equal the marginal product. In the traditional theory, this equality is presumably brought 
about by the competition of employers to obtain workers; but in times of unemployment, such competition 
obviously does not exist” (Patinkin, 1947, 113). 
25
 See Boianovsky (2006) for a detailed analysis of Patinkin’s hesitations on this point.  
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compromise on the market for goods, his attempt to formalize firms’ choice under additional 
restraints could have led him to write the very program that was put forward by Barro and 
Grossman (1971, 85) as an interpretation of his 1956 contribution: 
Maximize pY – wND subject to Y = Φ(N) and Y ≤ Y1.  
The result would have been an effective demand for labor of the form ND’ = Φ-1(Y1) and a 
“choice theoretic basis” for the spillover effect.  
But in chapters 7 and 9 dedicated to his macroeconomic models, Patinkin did not analyze 
agents’ decision programs. And when he finally considered firms’ decisions, in the 
“microeconomic” model of chapter 8, he considered a different and somewhat peculiar 
disequilibrium state. The additional restraint derived from the model bore on the demand for 
labor (ND ≡N) and not on production. This led to a curious result. Firms expressed an 
effective supply of goods YS’ = F(N). And since N was superior to their desired demand for 
labor Nf, this effective supply was larger than their desired supply26. 
Furthermore, Patinkin failed to see what he had achieved. Even though the definition of the 
additional restraint was inappropriate, firms’ programs defined a function of the “gi” type, an 
effective behavior function, well distinct from their Walrasian supply function. The additional 
restraint ND ≡N being given, firms chose their level of production. Yet, according to 
Patinkin, the “compromise” fixed the only decision variable of the agent (the capital stock 
being constant). For this reason he concluded: “There is no room to maximize. (…). Thus the 
values of these variables [Y and ND] are uniquely determined apart from any profit 
maximizing by the firm” (1947, 94). 
4.2. Households 
In the case of households Patinkin had gathered all the ingredients necessary to find 
Clower’s concept of “constrained demand functions” (1965, 119). Using his formalization of 
household maximization program (1947, 52-3) and following his definition of workers choice 
under additional restraint (1947, 94) we get the following result. As workers households 
maximized 
U(WN/P, L) 
subject to 
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 “Employers recognize that workers as a group desire to offer more labor than employers as a group desire 
to purchase. Therefore they will compromise and agree to hire more workers” (Patinkin, 1947: 93). 
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 L
 
+ N = T and N =N  
Therefore as consumers, they should have maximized  
U (Z2,…,Zn) 
subject to the budget constraint : 
p2Z2 + … + pnZn = y where y = WN + Π 27 
The result should have been a set of effective demands of the form Zi’ = Zi’(p1,…, pn-1, y). 
Since the Zi were supposed to be homogeneous of degree zero with respect to the money 
prices and wN (1947, 54), they could have been written under the form Zi’ = Zi’(p1/p,…, pn-1/p, 
Y) where Y = y/P. Above all, Patinkin should have realized that these demands were distinct 
from the Walrasian demands resulting from the maximization program without the additional 
constraint, demands depending only on prices: Zi = Zi(p1,…, pn-1, W). And since Patinkin 
assumed N < Ne, then Zi’< Zi, where Zi was the demand for good i determined by the 
“workers’ model”. Apparently, he could have shown that unemployment implied an effective 
demand for goods inferior to the notional demand and dependant on real income as an 
exogenous variable like Clower did in 1962 at the Royaumont conference. 
Yet, Patinkin missed the point. All along the elaboration of his unemployment theory he 
considered that the Keynesian demand function XD could be derived from the standard 
Walrasian maximization program. In contrast with Clower, he did not see the presence of 
income among the arguments of the consumption function as an analytical problem to be 
explained outside Walrasian theory. As I showed above, this mistake was written down in the 
most explicit way at the beginning of chapter 8 (1947, 89). A similar point was made in 
chapter 7 when Patinkin presented his modified diagonal cross diagram: 
For sections 38 and 39, we note that the expenditure function XD = XD(Y) represents the actions of buyers 
when they are free to fulfill their desires; i.e. their actions subject only to the restraint of the technological 
functions. (1947, 82) 
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 Here I preserve Patinkin’s presentation which did not distinguish clearly between goods, bonds and money. 
Note in particular the absence of any real balance effect. Furthermore, at various stage of his presentation, 
Patinkin assumed two propensities to consume, one out of wages and the other out of profits. And in chapter 6, 
profits did not appear in the maximization program of “individuals”. In others words, he introduced implicitly a 
class structure in his economy. In order to simplify the presentation, I assume that workers receive firms’ 
nominal profits Π. 
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Starting from this premise, Patinkin considered that he did not have to examine the choice of 
consumer-workers in the context of unemployment.  
If we go back to the section 28 of the thesis, mentioned in the quotation from chapter 8, we 
can see how the mistake crept in. Patinkin explicitly raised the issue of the introduction of 
income in the demand functions:  
The discussion in this chapter will concern itself with macroeconomic models. Usually a fundamental role in 
these models is played by the variable y representing money income. But our previous analysis has developed 
the excess demand functions as dependent on prices only. Our first task will accordingly be the investigation 
of changes in the maximization procedure which will cause the excess demand functions to depend on y also. 
For this to be true, y must bear the same relationship to the individual as did prices in the Walras-Pareto 
system. In other words, when the individual comes to decide on his purchases, he must consider his income 
as a given quantity which he can no longer affect. And this given income must then be allocated among the 
different goods. (1947, 52)  
Patinkin believed that a “double maximization procedure” was the solution28. The choice of 
workers between leisure and labor would determine consumers’ income. As a consequence, 
income could be treated as an exogenous datum of the choice between different goods (as in 
the maximization program presented above).29 
With hindsight, this approach and the confusion behind it are difficult to understand. Since 
Patinkin wrote down the maximization program underlying workers’ labor supply, he should 
have realized that their income was an endogenous variable dependant on the real wage. The 
choice theoretic basis of his macroeconomic models implied that the income variable entering 
aggregate demand could not vary unless the real wage itself varied. And this contradicted his 
analysis of the goods market in chapters 7, 8 and 9. But Patinkin followed the treatment of 
this issue found in the works of Klein and Lange. 
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 “One way of doing this is to consider the maximization procedure as broken up into two steps.” (1947, 52) 
29
 Another paragraph of the thesis shows how close Patinkin got to Clower’s effective demand theory: 
“Secondly, in order to introduce ya into the demand functions it is not necessary to assume a double 
maximization procedure of the type discussed here. All that is necessary is that in some way the individual 
should consider his money income given when he comes to select his purchases. Thus in the case where workers 
have no choice over either working hours or wage rate, their income will be taken as given and will enter their 
demand functions.” (1947, 53-4) Patinkin’s hesitation concerning the variable that cannot be decided by workers, 
“working hours or wage rate”, shows again that his thought was still confused on this matter. 
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In the “technical appendix” of The Keynesian Revolution, Klein (1947, 258-61)30 explained 
the “Mathematical derivation of the system of the General Theory”. The basis for the 
derivation of the Keynesian consumption function, the demand for bonds and the liquidity 
preference function was a maximization program in which income appeared as an exogenous 
variable. Though, in his analysis of the message of the General Theory, Klein assumed that 
the labor supply was an increasing function of the real wage (1947, 74-5 and 87), like 
Patinkin, he dissociated the choice between labor and leisure and the decision concerning the 
allocation of income. Unlike him, he did not comment on this option and the foundations of 
the labor supply were not explained. Klein simply followed the standard procedure: 
In the theory of consumer behavior, the usual practice is to start out with the utility function (or a monotonic 
transformation of the same), derive the utility-maximization equations, and finally solve the demand 
equations in terms of prices and income. (Klein, 1946, 306) 
In Price, Flexibility and Employment, Lange wrote down the choice of a consumer only 
once and in this instance he also treated income as an exogenous variable (1944, note 6, 16). 
And in “The Rate of Interest and the Optimum Propensity to Consume”, he argued that 
income was the hidden adjusting variable of the Walrasian system:  
By introducing the prices of all commodities [Walras] brings income indirectly into the equation expressing 
the propensity to save (1938, 21-22). 
The “maximization under additional restraints” was the solution of a puzzle that would 
wait for an adequate formulation until 1962 and Clower’s contribution to the Royaumont 
Conference. It is fascinating to see how, despite coming so close to Clowers’ breakthrough, 
Patinkin was not able to grasp the issue at hand and find the solution laying before him in his 
own systems of equations. He realized that the compatibility between the Keynesian 
aggregate demand function and general equilibrium price theory had to be clarified somehow. 
His own formulation of the maximization program of the worker-consumer in a situation of 
involuntary unemployment implied Clower’s notion of “constrained demand functions”. But 
he did not understand how deep the issue was. He could not escape from the approach 
followed by his contemporaries simply assuming that income was an exogenous variable of 
consumers’ choice in the Walrasian setting. Patinkin considered his additional restraint 
concept as an answer to another question. Writing down the programs of firms and 
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 The reference is to the 1966 edition of The Keynesian Revolution, but this passage was already in the 1947 
edition (1947, 192-5). 
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households in the context of unemployment equilibrium was necessary in order to offer “a 
precise mathematical definition of ‘involuntariness’ or coercion corresponding to our intuitive 
ideas” (1947: 105). More was a stake than a question of definition. But he did not see that 
modelling choices under additional restraint could help understand the interactions between 
different markets and the foundations of a non-Walrasian equilibrium. 
4.3.  The remainders of a Marshallian training 
As we noted in section 1.1, Patinkin’s basic training was Marshallian. In 1947, his 
command of Walrasian general equilibrium theory was still in its infancy. This throws some 
light on the shortcomings of his thesis. 
The fact that Patinkin never tried to analyze the interaction between the goods market and 
the labor market was an important source of confusion. Although he dealt with a general 
equilibrium system and referred to the Lausanne school, his approach was mainly partial 
equilibrium. The organization of Patinkin’s presentation illustrates the issue. In each chapter 
he considered one market only. In chapter 7 he analyzed the compromise on the market for 
goods. In chapter 8 he discussed the compromise over employment on the labor market. And 
in chapter 9 he discussed the compromise over real wage on the labor market. This is typical 
of a period in which economists began to deal with general equilibrium system with a 
Marshallian training31. 
The sequential conception of consumers’ maximizing program presented in the preceding 
section is another characteristic of the Marshallian approach (De Vroey, 1999a, 333). In a 
Walrasian general equilibrium framework, agents are supposed to determine simultaneously 
their offers and their demands for all commodities including labor. In this context, income is a 
dependent variable of consumers’ decisions in contradiction with the Keynesian consumption 
function and the Keynesian liquidity preference function. But economists like Klein, Lange or 
Patinkin were not fully fledged Walrasian. They viewed consumers’ choice as a two step 
process and either thought that this approach resolved the apparent contradiction, like 
Patinkin, or remained totally unaware of the difficulty. 
As stressed by De Vroey (1999a, 322), a hallmark of the Marshallian approach is the 
assumption that agents try to guess the equilibrium price of the market before it opens. As in 
Marshall’s corn market (chapter 2, book V of the Principles), agents anticipate the demand 
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 For the lack of adequate method to deal with general equilibrium in Modigliani (1944), see Rubin (2004).  
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curve and the supply curve of a given market, deduce the equilibrium price and decide the 
quantity that they will produce or demand accordingly. Even though Patinkin made no 
reference to expectations, the approach he followed in chapter 8 of the thesis was of a 
Marshallian sort. As I explained in section 2.3, firms and workers determined their desired 
levels of employment on the basis of their own models of the economy. But of course, in 
Patinkin’s theory agents could not guess the correct magnitudes. 
5. Conclusion: Patinkin’s thesis and later disequilibrium theories 
And it is this personal experience of knowing, but not knowing –knowing something, but not realizing its 
“obvious” implications for other problems with which I was concurrently dealing until a later point of time, 
an experience that I have had on other occasions as well –that has strongly influenced my subsequent work in 
the history of doctrines, especially that dealing with the discovery of the “General Theory”. (Patinkin, 1995, 
382) 
In spite of all the confusion surrounding Patinkin’s work, his Ph.D. thesis contained in 
embryo the research programs of disequilibrium economists of the 1970’s. I use the plural for, 
as Backhouse and Boianovsky (2005, 2006) have shown, the research programs pursued by 
disequilibrium theorists where heterogeneous. Patinkin’s work contained the basic issues and 
the seeds of the concepts that would feed later developments. Some of these ideas were 
elaborated by Patinkin himself, others would have to be reinvented. For there was still a long 
way from his 1947 theory of unemployment to the works of disequilibrium theorists in the 
1970s. The thesis was an instance of “knowing, but not knowing”. 
As we showed in part 1 and 2 of the paper, Patinkin attempted to reconstruct Keynes’ 
theory of involuntary unemployment taking the Walrasian model as his based camp. From 
this perspective, the problem raised by the Keynesian theory became the analysis of 
transactions taking place in disequilibrium or at prices that were not compatible with market-
clearing. This research program was characteristic of the contributions of Clower (1965) and 
Barro and Grossman (1971) and even more obvious as far as the French school of Benassy 
(1975) or Grandmont (1977) is concerned (De Vroey, 2004, 117). This project led Patinkin to 
lay down a number of concepts that pointed in the direction of disequilibrium theories. The 
theory of compromise showed that in a disequilibrium context, an adjustment mechanism 
distinct from the price mechanism was needed. It also implied the notion of a non-Walrasian 
equilibrium. In contrast with the stance of his later contributions (Patinkin, 1948 and 1956), in 
1947 Patinkin intended explicitly to account for the possibility of an unemployment 
equilibrium. Here history moved in spiral. Non-Walrasian equilibria were explored in the 
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1970s but economists based their analysis on the fixed price assumption that Patinkin always 
rejected. In 1947, Patinkin showed clearly that, in a disequilibrium context, agents were faced 
with additional constraints so that the choice theoretic basis of the general equilibrium models 
had to be modified. Furthermore, he realized that these additional constraints would generate 
demand functions (“gi”) distinct from the Walrasian demand functions (“hi”). In the case of 
unemployed workers, he identified correctly the additional constraint as the level of 
employment and came very close to Clower’s 1965 breakthrough. Besides, Patinkin wrote 
down the very diagrams that he would use in 1956 to analyze the behavior of firms faced with 
a sales constraint. The models of the thesis already contained an implicit spillover effect. In 
other words, the thesis contained the main ingredients needed to elaborate the choice theoretic 
basis of spillover effects and obtain a first understanding of interactions between markets in 
disequilibrium. 
But the conceptual distance between the thesis and later works was still wide. Eventually, 
Patinkin was not able to bring out the spillover effect or Clower’s notion of constrained 
consumer demand function. He had the general intuition but he could not see how to give it an 
operational content. Patinkin probably realized that his intuition could have let to something 
deeper. This is why in his conclusion he came back to the notion of additional restraint stating 
that a result more general than the behavior of firms and workers presented in his chapter 8 
was possible: 
62. In the analysis of chapter VIII it turned out that when the additional restriction was used, the behavior 
unit was no longer free to maximize utility or profit. In general, this need not be so; maximization subject to 
the additional restriction may still result in a schedule of alternatives. (1947, 116)  
But Patinkin’s reasoning was impeded by a partial equilibrium approach. In addition, the 
standard theory of consumers’ choice taking income as an independent variable prevented 
him from realizing the breach of continuity between the behavior of the Keynesian consumer 
and the behavior of the Walrasian consumer.32 Actually this problem remained the blind spot 
of his analysis in chapter 13 of Money, Interest and Prices. And even when he discussed 
Clower’s article on the “Keynesian counterrevolution” at the Royaumont conference in 1962, 
he did not realize the relation between Clower’s “dual decision hypothesis” and his chapter 
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 This explanation was already hinted at by Stanley Fisher (1993: 21) in relation to Money, Interest and 
Prices, a fact that Mauro Boianovsky brought to the attention of the author. 
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13.33 Last but not least, the theory of compromise was a very ad hoc construction and, as 
Patinkin soon realized, it left the price level and the rate of interest indeterminate. What he 
had considered as a theory of unemployment equilibrium was actually a theory of 
unemployment disequilibrium in the sense that prices were moving.  
For all these reasons, Patinkin’s Ph.D. dissertation should be considered as the pre-history 
of disequilibrium theories. History began with chapter 13 of Money, Interest and Prices, the 
result of a long and tortuous process of elaboration.34 In this chapter, Patinkin applied the 
concept of spillover in a Keynesian context and finally captured the operational intuition he 
had missed in his thesis. Faced with a sales constraint on the market for goods, firms would 
have to revise their demand for labor without taking into account the level of the real wage. 
This in turn would create an excess supply of labor and involuntary unemployment. The 
comparison between the thesis and chapter 13 clarifies the nature of Patinkin’s 1956 
breakthrough. First, he had passed from a partial equilibrium to a general equilibrium 
approach. The two key figures of the thesis (figure 1 and figure 2 above) survived in chapter 
13. But whereas in 1947 Patinkin analyzed each figure separately, in 1956 he focused on the 
interaction between them. The novelty was the tâtonnement method inspired by Lange (1944) 
and Walras (1926) and developed in the preceding chapters of the book.35 Second, Patinkin no 
longer left the wage rate, the price level and the rate of interest hanging in the air. He 
considered different scenarios on the basis of the relative adjustment speeds of prices. This 
approach was far from conclusive (De Vroey, 2002) but it had the merit to close the gap. Last, 
Patinkin argued more forcefully than he did in the thesis that the behavior of firms in the 
Keynesian scenario was at odds with the Walrasian behavior. This chapter 13 was a decisive 
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 “First, although I was a discussant of Clower’s well-known article “The Keynesian counterrevolution”: a 
theoretical appraisal” (1965) when it was first presented at a 1962 conference, only some time after I had 
published the second edition of my Money, Interest and Prices (1965) (on which I was working at the time of the  
conference) did I realize that his “dual decision hypothesis” about the behavior of consumers who were 
recipients of income from labor was simply the obverse side of the contention of my chapter 13 that the inability 
of firms to sell the quantity indicated by their supply curve for output, drawn at a given real wage, would make 
unwilling to employ the amount designated on their demand curve for labor for that real wage.” (Patinkin, 1995, 
382) This anecdote is confirmed by the reading of the discussions printed in the volume edited by Hahn and 
Brechling (1965) after the Royaumont conference.  
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 On this process see Boianovsky (2006).  
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 On this point see Rubin (2004, 198). 
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source of inspiration for Clower (1965) (Patinkin, 1989, xvii; Rubin, 2005b) and Barro and 
Grossman (1971) after him. 
Yet, in some respects, Patinkin’s thesis resembled disequilibrium theories of the 1970s 
more than his chapter 13. Though he still used the “additional restraint” in his definition of 
involuntary unemployment (1956, 212), the concept was totally absent from the rest of 
chapter 13. In Money, Interest and Prices, Patinkin returned to the “’old’ style of Marshall 
and Hicks” (Backhouse, 2002, 188) giving priority to verbal reasoning over algebra. This was 
probably a consequence of the thesis experience. In his autobiography, Patinkin regretted the 
emphasis on mathematics in his dissertation, and explained how afterwards he had tried to 
give a priority to the economic intuition:  
For like most doctoral students (then, and I am afraid even more so now), I attributed too much importance to 
the technique and formal mathematical analysis. And so my thesis gave much emphasis on the rigorous 
derivation of theorems from definitions, assumptions, and preliminary lemmas, while devoting inadequate 
attention to the economic interpretation of the analysis. (1995, 383) 
We have seen how Patinkin’s burning enthusiasm for mathematical economics led to the 
burgeoning models of the thesis. Yet the results were disappointing for him. The artificiality 
and the arbitrariness of his complex apparatus was severely criticized by his mentors at the 
Cowles Commission and he finally realized that what he had presented as an equilibrium was 
a disequilibrium state. Like the Keynes’ of the Treatise on Money, as Patinkin would write 
years later (1984, 97-8) quoting the General Theory, he had lost himself in a “maze of 
pretentious and unhelpful symbols”. This partially explains why he did not formalize the 
analysis of chapter 13 in 1956. The absence of a mathematical appendix has probably led 
many readers, like Leijonhufvud, to think that chapter 13 was more superficial than the others, 
an amateur incursion into the field of Keynesian theory. The opposite was true. Knowing by 
experience how difficult the mathematical translation was, Patinkin consciously concentrated 
on the essential, the economic intuition. As he put it in a letter to Leijonhuvfud in 1974, he 
“did not succeed in achieving an integration of [his] economic intuition with [his] formal 
analysis”. As shown by Boianovsky’s presentation of the correspondence between Nissan 
Liviatan and Patinkin, Patinkin came up against the same objection over and again. Like the 
members of the Cowles Commission before him, Liviatan asserted that Patinkin’s analysis of 
the process of income determination implied imperfect competition36. As a consequence of 
these criticisms, Patinkin abandoned the ambition of the thesis. He put forward what he 
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considered to be his most important intuition, the spillover effect, and kept assuming perfect 
competition but he abandoned the idea of formalizing involuntary action as the outcome of 
choice under additional restraint. Yet, we suspect that a more profound change of mind was at 
work behind the exclusion of the concept of additional restraint from Patinkin’s central 
message. In his thesis, Patinkin reconstructed agents’ maximizing programs along the lines 
that would be followed by Barro and Grossman (1971) and this without remorse. The 
correspondence with Liviatan and Patinkin’s comments on Barro and Grossman (1971) at the 
Perugia conference (Boianovsky, 2006, 244) seem to indicate that at some point he became 
convinced that the approach of the thesis was faulty. In 1956 he had come to believe that his 
programs with additional constraints were inconsistent with the standard behavior of agents in 
a perfectly competitive system. This way of rationalizing and formalizing the spillover effect 
was not acceptable. The solution that he called for, in note 9 of chapter 13, was not the 
elaboration of a non-Walrasian micro like in the thesis but a more sophisticated Walrasian 
micro. In a letter to Liviatan about the behavior of firms in chapter 13, Patinkin wrote : “I am 
interested in working on the traditional acceptable way of price theory” (quoted by 
Boianovsky, 2006, 232). The same position appeared in the new introduction of the second 
edition of Money, Interest and Prices in 1989 where he stressed the fact that disequilibrium 
macroeconomics “violates the assumption of rational economic behaviour” and quoted with 
approval the works of New Keynesian that “rationalized the seemingly irrational” (1989, 
xviii). To conclude, chapter 13 marked a crucial step forward in the elaboration of 
disequilibrium macroeconomics but it may have contained simultaneously a step backward 
announcing Lucas notion of equilibrium “discipline”. What Clower (1965) or Barro and 
Grossman (1971) did was to reinvent the concept of choice under additional restraint that 
Patinkin had put aside along the way. 
Appendix 
Maximization under “additional restraints”: a general formulation 
“For instance, consider a consumer maximizing his utility from n goods 
(62.1)  u (Z1,…, Zn) 
Subject to the budget restraint 
(62.2) p1Z1 + p2Z2 + … + pnZn = y  
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(where pi = price and y = income are considered as given) and some additional restriction 
(say, some sort of rationing control) 
(62.3)  θ(Z1, Z2,…, Zn) = 0. 
Then he maximizes 
(62.4)  u (Z1,…, Zn) - λ1 (p1Z1 + p2Z2 + … + pnZn – y) – λ2 θ(Z1, Z2,…, Zn) 
To yield the n equations 
(62.5)  ui – λ1pi – λ2 θi = 0 (i = 1,…, n). 
Thus we have n+2 equations (62.2), (62.3), (62.5) in n+2 variables: the Zi, λ1, and λ2. 
Solving in terms of the pi and λ we have 
(62.6) λj = fj (p1,…, pn-1, y) (j = 1,2) 
(62.7)  zi = gi (p1,…, pn-1, y) (r = 1,…,n).” 
 (1947a : 116-117). 
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Abstract: In the opening sentence of Money, Interest, and Prices, Patinkin noted that his 
book was the outgrowth of ideas first presented in his doctoral dissertation. This claim has 
attracted the attention of most scholars who wrote about his works in recent years. As shown 
by Boianovsky (2006), Merhling (2002) or Rubin (2002), reading Patinkin’s doctoral 
dissertation shed new light on his major work. However, these articles only contain partial 
presentations of the thesis. This essay contributes to fill in this gap. It offers a detailed 
presentation of the second part of Patinkin’s Ph.D and claims that this document 
foreshadowed the research programs of disequilibrium theorists of the 1970’s.  
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